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Abstract
Explaining the maintenance of communicative behavior in the face of incentives to deceive, conceal information, or
exaggerate is an important problem in behavioral biology. When the interests of agents diverge, some form of signal cost is
often seen as essential to maintaining honesty. Here, novel computational methods are used to investigate the role of
common interest between the sender and receiver of messages in maintaining cost-free informative signaling in a signaling
game. Two measures of common interest are defined. These quantify the divergence between sender and receiver in their
preference orderings over acts the receiver might perform in each state of the world. Sampling from a large space of
signaling games finds that informative signaling is possible at equilibrium with zero common interest in both senses. Games
of this kind are rare, however, and the proportion of games that include at least one equilibrium in which informative
signals are used increases monotonically with common interest. Common interest as a predictor of informative signaling
also interacts with the extent to which agents’ preferences vary with the state of the world. Our findings provide a
quantitative description of the relation between common interest and informative signaling, employing exact measures of
common interest, information use, and contingency of payoff under environmental variation that may be applied to a wide
range of models and empirical systems.
Citation: Godfrey-Smith P, Martı́nez M (2013) Communication and Common Interest. PLoS Comput Biol 9(11): e1003282. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003282
Editor: Carl T. Bergstrom, University of Washington, United States of America
Received July 31, 2013; Accepted September 2, 2013; Published November 7, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Godfrey-Smith, Martı́nez. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work has been partially supported by a Beatriu de Pinós grant (http://www10.gencat.cat/agaur_web/); the DGI, Spanish Goverment, research
project FFI2010-15717; and The Graduate Center of the City University New York (http://gc.cuny.edu/). The funders had no role in study design, data collection
and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: mmartinez3@gc.cuny.edu
Introduction
Many theorists have seen communication as a fundamentally
cooperative phenomenon [1–4]. In an evolutionary context,
however, cooperation cannot be taken for granted, because of
problems of subversion and free-riding [5]. In the case of
communication, these problems include both refusal to share
information, and deception, or lying for one’s own advantage. If
lying is common, there is no point in listening to what anyone says.
If no one is listening, there is no point in talking.
In recent work the situation is often sketched as follows: it is easy
to see how communication can be viable if there is complete
concordance of interests between senders and receivers of signs.
Then communication can result in useful coordination and
division of labor. There is no mystery about signaling within
multicellular organisms, for example, including hormonal and cell-
to-cell signaling (although conflicts of interest may arise even here:
[6]). In between-organism contexts, the problem of conflict of
interest rapidly becomes acute. Special mechanisms are needed to
explain how honesty is maintained. The main approach taken in
recent years has been costly signaling theory [7–9]. Intrinsic costs of
signaling prevent dishonesty, by differential expense to liars or
differential benefits to the honest.
‘‘Cheap talk’’ models, where signaling has no costs, have seen
some development [10–15] but have been minor players in recent
years. Here we use a novel method to examine ways that
informative signaling can be sustained without cost in a range of
situations of partial and low common interest. We use a version of
the Lewis sender-receiver model [1,16], and employ a method of
sampling and analyzing cases drawn from a large space of games
with different relationships between sender and receiver payoffs.
We then offer generalizations based on analysis of the sample of
cases. The analysis uses coarse-grained measures of common
interest between sender and receiver, and attends also to a feature
that interacts with common interest: the degree to which payoffs
for an agent depend on different acts being produced in different
states, the contingency of payoff for that agent.
We find that using a simple and intuitive measure of common
interest based on comparisons of preference orderings over
actions, it is possible, though rare, for informative signaling to
be maintained at equilibrium with complete divergence of
interests. We then construct a more fine-grained measure of
common interest, one that is more demanding in its classification
of a case as one of zero common interest, and find that informative
signaling with zero common interest is possible in this stronger
sense as well. Defining an information-using equilibrium as one where
the receiver makes use of informative signals to guide behavior, the
proportion of games that include at least one information-using
equilibrium increases monotonically and rather smoothly with
both measures of common interest. (See below, in the Methods
section, for the equilibrium concept we use throughout the paper.)
We then look at the equilibria that support the highest amount of
information use for a given level of common interest, and again
find a monotonic, though less smooth, relationship between degree
of common interest and maximum information use. A third
analysis, looking at the relationship between common interest and
contingency of payoff for sender and receiver (defined below),
yields more complicated results.
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We conclude that informative signaling can be stable in
situations of minimal, even zero, common interest. A combination
of mixed strategies of signal use by both senders and receivers, and
the selective pooling of states by the sender, makes possible the
extreme cases of this phenomenon. Pooling alone can suffice in
cases where divergence of interests is not so extreme. As interests
converge, stability of informative signaling becomes easier to
achieve. Our model complements other recent work on the
adaptive importance of mixed strategies and partially informative
signaling in evolution.
Methods
Our modeling framework draws on Lewis [1] and Skyrms [16].
We assume that the world varies exogenously and has three
equally probable states (S1, S2, S3). The sender perceives (without
error) the state of the world and responds by mapping states to
signals (m1, m2, m3). The mapping need not be one-to-one as the
sender may ‘‘pool’’ some states, treating them equivalently, and
the sender may also probabilistically ‘‘mix’’ signals in response to a
given state. The receiver perceives (without error) the signal sent
and maps signals to acts (A1, A2, A3), with pooling and mixes
possible again. So a combination of sender and receiver rules can
be represented as follows:
Sender: S1?m1; S2?m2; S3? (2=3)m1,(1=3)m3½ 
Receiver: m1?A1; m2? (1=2)A1,(1=2)A2½ ; m3?A2
For example, the sender here sends message 1 whenever they
see state 1, message 2 whenever they see state 2, and in state 3 they
flip a biased coin to send message 1 two thirds of the time and
message 3 one third of the time. Both sides receive payoffs as a
consequence of the combination of the receiver’s action and the
state of the world. Sender and receiver payoffs may differ, and can
be represented in the form seen in Table 1.
The payoff matrix defines a preference ordering over acts in
each state for both sender and receiver. For example, in Table 1,
the preference ordering for the sender in state 1 is [A2.A1.A3],
and for the receiver [A3.A2.A1]. A simple measure of the
degree of common interest in a game tracks how similar the
orderings for sender and receiver are, for each state: there is
complete common interest when sender and receiver have the same
preference ordering over acts in every state, and complete conflict of
interest when these orderings are reversed in every state. Between
these extremes are various kinds of partial common interest: sender
and receiver might agree on the best act in each state, but disagree
otherwise; they might always agree on what is worst, but not
otherwise; they might agree entirely in some states but disagree in
others.
In cases of complete common interest, some consequences for
informative signaling are easily seen. With complete common
interest, sender and receiver can both receive their maximum
payoffs when the sender maps states to signals one-to-one and the
receiver uses these signals to guide appropriate actions. This is a
signaling system in the sense of Lewis [1], and neither party has any
incentive to change what they are doing. This state might not be
attained by the selection process shaping sender and receiver
behaviors, but if it is reached it is stable [17]. With complete
conflict of interest, it would appear that signaling cannot be
maintained, as any information about the state of the world
carried by signals can be used by the receiver to produce acts
contrary to the sender’s interests, and any sensitivity to signals in
the receiver can be exploited by the sender. Exploring the
generality of this phenomenon is one aim of this paper. Another is
quantifying the relationship between common interest and
informative signaling.
The varieties of partial common interest described above do not
form a complete ordering. However, a coarse-grained measure of
the overall degree of common interest can be constructed by
modifying the Kendall tau distance. This measure describes the
similarity in the ordering of the items in two lists, by counting
discordant pairs of items across the lists. The first two items in the
two lists form a discordant pair with respect to a preference
ordering, for example, if in list 1 the first item is preferred to the
second item, whereas in list 2 the second item is preferred to the
first. We define a measure C of the common interest in a payoff
matrix of the form in Table 1 by counting the discordant pairs in
the sender’s and receiver’s preference orderings over acts in each
state of the world, and then averaging across states and rescaling
the results to yield a number between 0 and 1, where C~1
corresponds to complete common interest and C~0 corresponds
to complete conflict of interest. In response to results outlined
below we also make use of a refinement of C; which compares not
only the agents’ preference orderings of the actions in each state,
but also tracks how the agents’ payoffs for each action relate to the
mean value of the payoffs the agent might receive in that state.
(For details see Text S1.) As discussed below, C is one among
several ways of refining the simpler measure, C, and we do not
claim it is best for all purposes.
We also make use of a further description of payoff matrices.
For each agent, how much does payoff depend on matching
different actions to each state of the world? A simple illustration of
Table 1. A payoff matrix.
S1 S2 S3
A1 5,0 2,4 0,6
A2 6,5 0,0 1,5
A3 0,6 6,6 5,3
The pair of numbers in each cell represent the sender’s and the receiver’s




How can honest communication evolve, given the many
incentives to deceive, conceal information, or exaggerate?
In recent work, it has often been supposed that either
common interest between the sender and receiver of
messages must be present, or special factors (such as a
special cost for dishonest production of signals) must be in
place. When talk is cheap, what is the minimum degree of
common interest that will suffice to maintain communi-
cation? We give new quantitative measures of common
interest between communicating agents, and then use a
computer search of signaling games to work out the
relationship between the degree of common interest and
the maintenance of signaling that conveys real informa-
tion. Surprisingly, we find that informative signaling can in
some cases be maintained with zero common interest.
These cases are rare, and we also find that the degree of
common interest is a good predictor of whether informa-
tive signaling is a likely outcome of an interaction. The
upshot is that two agents with highly incompatible
preferences may still find ways to communicate, but the
more they see eye-to-eye, the more likely it is that
communication will be viable.
Communication and Common Interest
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the importance of this feature is seen in a case where the receiver
has the same best act for every state (has a dominant strategy
available). Then the receiver can achieve maximum payoff no
matter what the sender does, by mapping all signals to that cover-
all act. Even if no one act is best in all states, there may be a cover-
all act that works well for an agent nearly all the time. This is a
within-agent matter. So we define KS and KR, also making use of
the Kendall tau distance. For each agent, we compare the
preference orderings over acts that apply in different states of the
world, comparing each pair of states in turn. K is high for an agent
with respect to a pair of states if good acts in one state are bad acts
in the other state. K for an agent averages all comparisons of
states, rescaled to lie between zero and one, where K~1
corresponds to the highest degree of contingency of payoff. (For
details see Text S1.)
Our aim is to generalize about games with different levels of
common interest and contingency of payoff for the agents. The
method used is to generate samples from the space of games with
three states where sender and receiver payoffs are integers between
0 and 99. Payoffs for each player for each act in a state are chosen
randomly, so 18 random choices specify payoffs for a game. We
then use the implementation of Lemke’s [18] algorithm provided
by the software package Gambit [19] to search for equilibria in that
game where informative signals are being sent and used. The
equilibrium concept used is the Nash equilibrium: a pair of
strategies form a Nash equilibrium if neither player can improve
their payoff by unilaterally modifying their strategy.
We measure the degree to which agents engage in informative
signaling with mutual information, a symmetrical measure of the
degree of association between two variables, measured in bits [20,
p. 7]. An equilibrium is an information-using equilibrium if there is
non-zero mutual information between states of the world and the
receiver’s acts. We focus on mutual information between states
and acts for the following reasons. If there is mutual information
between states and acts, the only way for this to arise is for senders
to send informative signals and receivers to use these signals to
guide variation in their actions to some extent. It is possible for
senders to send signals with information about the state of the
world that is not used – informative signals that are ignored by the
receiver. It is possible also for receivers to guide actions with
different signals sent randomly by the sender. The first of these –
informative signals that are ignored – is a situation which may be
an equilibrium and in which there is informative signaling, but it is
not a situation in which the receiver is making use of that
information. Our primary focus is situations in which informative
signals are both sent and used. This requires that the signals carry
information about states and acts carry information about signals.
Given that receivers only have access to the state of the world by
attending to signals, by the data processing inequality [20, p. 34] it is
not possible for acts to carry more information about states than
signals do. (States, signals, and acts form a Markov chain.) Any
mutual information between states and acts arises from the use by
the receiver of information about states in the signals.
Computational methods are described in Text S1 but one
feature should be noted here: Lemke’s algorithm is not guaranteed
to find every equilibrium in a game [21]. So the reports of
information-using equilibria below may be under-counts.
Results
To investigate the role of C we generated a random sample from
the space of games with three equiprobable states, three receiver
actions, and independently chosen payoffs for sender and receiver
associated with each receiver action in each state of the world.
(Each value of C is represented by 1500 games.) These sender and
receiver payoffs are integers between 0 and 99. For each game we
asked whether there is at least one information-using equilibrium
in that game – an equilibrium with nonzero mutual information
between states and acts – and then asked what proportion of
games at each level of C have at least one information-using
equilibrium. (All these games also have equilibria that are not
information-using equilibria). The results are shown in Figure 1.
Very low degrees of C suffice to enable information-using
equilibria, but at low C levels, only a small minority of games do so
(unless the algorithm used has significant bias). As C increases, the
fraction of games with information-using equilibria increases
monotonically.
The curve in Figure 1 does not reach 100% for the case of
complete common interest. Some games with C~1 are games
with zero KS and KR. (When C~1, K is the same for sender and
receiver.) The same act is best in every state. Around 1/9 games
with C~1 will also be K~0. In such a game, the receiver can
always take the system to an equilibrium by mapping all signals to
the same, optimal, act. Then there is no mutual information
between states and acts, regardless of what the sender is doing, as
there is no variation in acts.
Surprisingly, a small number of games with C~0, where sender
and receiver have reversed preference orderings over acts in every
state, have information-using equilibria. Table 2 shows a case of
this kind – not a case from one of our samples, but a simplified
case constructed using the computer-generated cases as a guide.
Despite zero C, the game in Table 2 has an information-using
equilibrium, whose sender and receiver rules are as follows:
Sender: S1?m1; S2?½(1=2)m1,(1=2)m3; S3?m3
Receiver: m1?A1; m2?½(2=3)A2,(1=3)A3; m3?½(2=3)A2,
(1=3)A3
The mutual information between states and acts at this
equilibrium is 0.67 bits, where the highest possible value for a
game with three equiprobable states (a Lewisian signaling system)
is 1.58 bits.
A feature of the case in Table 2 is that although sender and
receiver have reversed preferences in every state, in S1 they share
a second-best outcome (A1) that is almost as good as their best.
This is ignored by our measure C, and it is one kind of common
interest between the two agents. A way to modify C that takes this
factor into account is to compare, across sender and receiver, their
preference orderings over both the payoffs that arise from different
actions and also the average of the payoffs for that agent in that
Figure 1. The proportion of games at each level of C with at
least one information-using equilibrium. For each value of C,
n~1500.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003282.g001
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state. This is done by defining a ‘‘dummy act’’ for the receiver in
each state, an act that secures for each agent the mean of the other
payoffs possible in that state. This dummy act and its payoff are
then included in the determination of each agent’s preference
ordering over acts in that state; the two agents might agree, or
disagree, for example, about whether the payoff of Act 1 is higher
than the mean of their payoffs possible in that state. C, like C,
counts discordant pairs of preferences and is scaled to lie between
0 and 1. (For further details see Text S1). C yields a similar
relationship between common interest and the proportion of
games with an information-using equilibrium to that seen in
Figure 1.
The game in Table 2 has a nonzero C, as sender and receiver
agree about how one of their second-best outcomes compares to
their means for that state, so C~0 is a more demanding criterion
for complete conflict of interest. Even in this stronger sense,
though, it is possible for a game to have an information-using
equilibrium with complete conflict of interest. A case of this kind,
also one modeled on a less transparent computer-generated case, is
shown in Table 3. This game has the following information-using
equilibrium:
Sender: S1?m3; S2?½(3=7)m2,(4=7)m3; S3?m2
Receiver: m1?A2; m2?½(5=7)A1,(2=7)A3; m3?A2
In all the cases with C~0 and/or C~0 with information-
using equilibria we have found, the underlying pattern is as
follows. Two signals are used by the sender and three acts are used
by the receiver. In one state the receiver produces an act that is
intermediate in value for both sides. In the cases in Tables 2 and 3,
this is S1. The receiver is prevented from shifting to their optimal
act for this state by the fact that the signal sent in that state is
ambiguous, and is sometimes also sent in a state for which the act
that might ‘‘tempt’’ the receiver in S1 would be very bad. In
another state, the receiver mixes their actions between optimal acts
for each side. (This is S3 in both Tables 2 and 3.) Again, the
receiver is prevented from settling on their optimal act in S3 by the
fact that the message the sender sends in that state is ambiguous;
state 2 is used by the sender to deter exploitation in the other two
states, and in this state all three acts are produced.
In both cases in Tables 2 and 3 the information-using equilbria
are very fragile, as either the sender (in 3) or the receiver (in 2) can
shift without penalty to a strategy in which the mutual information
between states and acts goes to zero. Not all cases of information-
using equilbria and zero common interest have this feature,
however; sometimes information-use is less easily lost. The lowest
level of common interest at which an information-using equilib-
rium is found in which neither sender nor receiver plays a mixed
strategy, probabilistically varying their response to a state or a
signal, is C~0:11 (see Text S1 for examples of both phenomena
described in this paragraph).
A valuable feature of C is the weakness of the assumptions
required for its measurement; C assumes only ordinal, not
cardinal, utilities. C assumes cardinal utilities. C does not,
however, assume that sender and receiver utilities are commen-
surable. If that further assumption is made, the notion of zero
common interest can be analyzed instead by requiring that in
every state, sender and receiver payoffs sum to a constant and the
choice of action determines only how the division is made (a
‘‘constant-sum game’’). We do not claim in this paper that
information-using equilibria exist in constant-sum games. All
constant-sum games have C~0, though the converse does not
hold. Some constant-sum games have nonzero C, on the other
hand, and not all C~0 games are constant-sum. Due to its
simplicity and weak assumptions, in the remainder of the body of
this paper we will use C to measure common interest. C and
constant-sum games are discussed in Text S1.
Once we know how likely a given level of C is to maintain at
least one information-using equilibrium, we can also ask what is
the highest level of mutual information between states and acts
that can be maintained in a game with a given degree of C.
Figure 2 shows the maximum amount of mutual information
between states and acts generated by an equilibrium pair of
strategies from any game examined with a given level of C. In
constructing the pool of cases for this analysis, we have included
not just the sample of games used in Figure 1 but also games found
in earlier samples.
Figure 2 shows that the highest value for information use grows
monotonically with common interest, as expected, but in a step-
like way and with quite high values of mutual information between
states and acts seen even at the lowest values of C. Conversely, our
sample includes cases with high values of C and very minimal
information use at equilibrium (C~0:78, mutual informa-
tion = 0.03 bits; see Text S1).
A further analysis of these cases takes into account the
contingency of payoff for sender and receiver, as well as common
interest. The importance of this factor has been evident already in
Table 2. A game with C~0 and an information-using
equilibrium.
S1 S2 S3
A1 5,5 2,4 2,1
A2 6,0 0,6 3,0
A3 0,6 6,0 0,3
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003282.t002
Table 3. A game with C~0 and an information-using
equilibrium.
S1 S2 S3
A1 1,8 8,1 0,6
A2 3,7 6,3 1,5
A3 8,1 1,8 5,3
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003282.t003
Figure 2. The highest level of information use at each level of
C. Measured in bits. For each value of C, n~1500.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003282.g002
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some extreme cases. When there is complete common interest but
K is zero for both sides, there is no problem for signaling to solve –
a single act always delivers an optimal payoff. When there is less
common interest, the contingency of payoff for sender and
receiver can diverge, and in most cases will be different. Figure 3
charts the proportion of games with at least one information-using
equilibrium as a function of both common interest and contin-
gency of payoff for an agent; separate graphs are given for C and
KS (left), and for C and KR (right). The sample used for this chart
is not the same one used for Figure 1, as a random sample of all
games with a certain C under-represents some combinations of C
and K . Figure 3 uses a sample in which every combination of C
and K is represented by 1500 games.
As expected, higher values of K generate more information-
using equilibria than lower values of K . A difference is seen,
however, between the consequences of low values of KS and KR.
When the sender’s contingency of payoff is very low, the
intermediate values of C present a local maximum in the
proportion of games with information-using equilibria. When KS
is low and C is intermediate, KR will be appreciable. The receiver
seeks to vary their actions with the state of the world, and though
the sender would ideally like the same act to always be performed,
equilibria exist in which a compromise is reached. When the
receiver’s K is low, on the other hand, they can achieve optimal
payoffs by mapping every signal to the same act. The receiver can
‘‘go it alone’’ (though information-using equilibria arise in a few
cases with high C because of ties for the optimal act in a state).
Discussion
We have given a treatment of the relation between informative
signaling and common interest between sender and receiver, in a
framework where signal use is associated with no differential costs
and no role is given to iteration of interactions between agents. We
find that informative signaling is possible in situations where
sender and receiver have reversed preference orderings over
receiver actions in every state of the world. This situation, where
C~0, is one sense of ‘‘complete conflict of interest,’’ and a sense
that has been employed more informally in a range of earlier
discussions (eg., [22,23]. In the light of our results, C~0 is shown
to be a somewhat undemanding sense of complete conflict. We
discussed one refinement of C, which requires stronger assump-
tions about payoffs, and found that information use at equilibrium
is possible with complete conflict even in this stronger sense, where
C~0. Another way to refine the idea of complete conflict, a way
that uses still stronger assumptions, is by appeal to the notion of a
constant-sum game. We do not claim that informative signaling is
possible at equilibrium in constant-sum games. Another way to
interpret our results is to suggest that the degree of conflict of interest
in a game cannot be analyzed by noting the relationships holding
between preferences in particular states, and then generalizing
across states. Moving beyond consideration of these extreme values,
we find that C is a good predictor of the existence of information-
using equilibria in the space of games studied in this paper.
We note several limitations of our model. First, the model
assumes a particular relationship between sender and receiver, one
where the sender has private knowledge of a state of the world,
and payoffs result from the coordination of receiver actions with
this state. This ‘‘state’’ of the world might be the condition or
quality of the sender. Another kind of model assumes that neither
side has privileged information about the state of the world, and
the role of signaling is to coordinate acts with acts rather than acts
with states (the ‘‘battle of the sexes,’’ for example). In further work
we hope to extend our analysis to cover these cases. Another
limitation involves our use of the Nash equilibrium concept. A
Nash equilibrium need not be an evolutionarily stable strategy
(because rivals may increase in frequency due to ‘‘drift’’). In
addition, equilibria of this kind may not be easily found by an
evolutionary process [17]. Further work is needed to explore the
dynamic properties of the games discussed in this paper. Thirdly,
our analysis gives no role to the biological plausibility of games.
We close by comparing our treatment with two other papers,
one classic and one recent. First, Crawford and Sobel [10] treated
agreement in interests as a matter of degree, and found that when
interests diverge, honest signaling is possible, but with lower
informational content than there would be with complete
agreement: ‘‘equilibrium signaling is more informative when
agents’ preferences are more similar.’’ In their model, the state of
the world (sender quality) and the available actions both vary
continuously in one dimension, and the difference between sender
and receiver interests corresponds to a constant that is the
difference between the actions seen as optimal by sender and by
receiver in a given state of the world. In their model the degree of
common interest across games can be measured exactly, but the
model makes strong assumptions about the pattern of variation in
the world. Our model makes weaker assumptions in this area, with
the consequence that common interest is only partially ordered,
motivating the introduction of coarse-grained measures such as C
and C. Crawford and Sobel found that as agents’ interest
converge, a larger number of distinct signals can be sent at
equilibrium. We found that informative signaling can exist with
zero common interest, through a combination of pooling and
Figure 3. Relation between common interest, contingency of payoff for each agent, and the proportion of games with an
information-using equilibrium. See Text S1 for explanations of C, KS and KR. 1500 games were sampled and analyzed for each jointly possible
combination of C and KS (KR).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003282.g003
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mixing, though games of this kind are rare and the proportion of
games with an information-using equilibrium increases as interests
converge. Crawford and Sobel’s model also did not allow for
variation in K , which we find has significant effects on the viability
of information use.
Second, Zollman et al. [24] investigated biologically plausible
games with two possible states of the world (again, sender quality)
that are usually analyzed with substantial differential costs
enforcing honesty. These authors found that very small differences
in cost or benefit across different types of senders can maintain
honest signaling when both sender and receiver mix strategies in a
particular way. Senders in one state mix two signals, and senders
in another state send just one of those signals. Receivers mix their
responses to the ambiguous signal and do not mix their responses
to the other. A conclusion from their model is that variation in
signal-using behavior within a given situation, on both sender and
receiver sides, need not be a matter of mere ‘‘noise’’ but can be an
essential feature of an equilibrium state. Our results, within a
framework of zero signal cost, lead to a conclusion of the same
kind: probabilistic mixing of strategies, along with partial
‘‘pooling’’ of inputs, by both sign producers and sign interpreters
can be important in maintaining signaling in situations of low
common interest.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Methods – definitions – additional examples – C, C,
and constant-sum games – Interactions between common interest
and contingency of payoff.
(PDF)
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